Juries

Jury News

WNYT: Juror #10 in McElheny trials blasts District Attorney

Orlando Sentinel: When should we question jurors about their verdicts?

‎Chillicothe Gazzette: Court battles reduced juror turnout

Salt Lake Tribune: Racial bias involving Utah tribal member won't go before high court

‎NorthJersey.com: Juror who caused mistrial won't be held in contempt

‎Gothamist: "Merchant Of Death" Jurors Can't Mention Trial On Facebook, Twitter‎

More Juror Misconduct in the Digital Age

Here are two stories discussing how jurors continue to improperly use technology.  The first article looks at examples of improper juror behavior in New York. The second article examines a California case where a juror used her cell phone to read a news article about the trial on which she was sitting.

Albany Times Union: Jurors need to avoid case on the Internet

‎Freson Bee: Juror's action puts murder-attempt conviction in limbo

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Jury News

News Journal: Convictions tossed on juror concern

‎NBC Miami: FBI: Federal Juror Offered To Fix Trial For $100000‎

Atlanta Journal Constitution: Knox juror says prosecution's case just conjecture‎

Patch.com: Blagojevich Jury Forewoman Sheds Light on Decision-Making Process

Wall Street Journal: From the Law Blog

UPI: Legal adviser blasts jury selection

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Non Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes: New Law Review Article

Jeannette E. Walston. Comment. Do Non-Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes Really Exist, or is a Juror's Right to Sit on a Jury Denied when the Court Allows the use of Peremptory Strikes?  17 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 371 (2011).

This Comment explores the right of citizens to be part of the justice system by exercising their right to sit on a jury. A citizen’s right to be empanelled, however, could directly affect a party’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Thus, some safeguards, such as challenges for cause, must be kept in place. However, the use of peremptory strikes may be interfering far more with a citizen’s right to sit on a jury than with a party’s right to a fair and impartial trial.

 

Supplemental Arguments to the Jury: U.S. v. Evanston

Earlier this year, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Evanston examined the issues that arise when attorneys are allowed to re-argue their case to resolve a jury deadlock. In Evanston, the defendant was charged with assaulting his live-in girlfriend.  Since the assault occurred on a Indian reservation, it was brought in federal court.

After five hours of deliberation over two days, the jury advised that it could not reach a verdict.  The district court then gave the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 7.7--commonly referred to as an Allen charge, deadlock instruction, or "dynamite charge" and asked the jury to continue to deliberate.

After further deliberations, the jury was still deadlocked so the trial judge suggested that the jurors be called in to determine what issues they are stuck on and allow counsel 10 additional minutes of argument.  Despite objections by the defense, the trial judge went forward and determined that the jury was stuck on two issues: (1) witness credibility; and (2) the cause of the victim's injuries.  The judge then allowed each side time to address both concerns.  At the end of the supplemental arguments, the jurors returned to deliberations and after two hours found the defendant guilty.

In overturning the conviction, the three judge panel of the 9th Circuit determined that [t]he supplemental arguments here intruded upon the jury's fact-finding role in two ways and through two conduits: (1) the judge's questionning as to the reasons for the deadlock required that the jury divulge the state of its unfinished deliberations, there violating the jury's deliberative secrecy ... and (2) the parties supplemental arguments, coupled with the judge's insistence on continuing after a second deadlock injected the court and the attorneys into the jury's deliberative process, thereby raising the specter of juror coercion.

The panel went on to state that they did not foreclose the possibility that supplemental argument treating factual matters could ever be used.  In this case, however, the panel determined that allowing supplemental arguments was indeed an abuse of the trial court's discretion because the practice has not been adopted by the federal court (to date only AZ, CA, and ND have adopted the practice) and the trial judge had alternatives to using supplemental arguments such as rereading the jury instructions or reading back witness testimony.

Jury News

Baltimore Sun: Westboro Baptist case: Juries on trial

US News & World Report (blog): John Grisham Says Small Town Juries Too Easy to Sway

Arizona Daily Star (blog): At the Courthouse: Juror commits big No-No

Telegraph.co.uk: Amanda Knox juror: lack of motive sank case for Meredith Kercher ...

Boston Herald: Hung-gry jury? Defense attorney says lack of food tainted group's ...

Wall Street Journal (Blog): Skip Jury Duty at Your Peril

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Addressing Juror Bias: New Law Review Article

Anna Roberts, Reforming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 Conn. L. Rev. XXX (2012)

Abstract:     
This Article investigates whether one of the most intractable problems in trial procedure can be ameliorated through the use of one of the most striking discoveries in social science. The intractable problem is selecting a fair jury. Current doctrine fails to address the fact that jurors harbor not only explicit, or conscious bias, but also implicit, or unconscious, bias. The discovery is the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), an online test that aims to reveal implicit bias.

This Article conducts the first comparison of proposals that the IAT be used to address jury bias. They fall into two groups. The first group would use the IAT to “screen” potential jurors for implicit bias; the second group would use the IAT to educate jurors about implicit bias. These proposals merit deeper consideration. Implicit bias is pervasive, and affects crucial juror functions: evaluation of evidence, recall of facts, and judgments of guilt. Juries are generally told nothing about implicit bias. The judiciary has expressed concern about implicit juror bias, and sought help from the academy in addressing the problem.

I provide what the proposals lack: critique and context. I show that using the IAT to screen jurors is misguided. The educational project has merit, however, since implicit bias can be countered through knowledge of its existence and motivation to address it. To refine the project, I identify two vital issues that distinguish the proposals: when jurors should learn about implicit bias, and how they should learn.

On the issue of when, I argue that the education should begin while the jurors are still being oriented. Orientation is not only universal, but, as research into “priming” and “framing” has shown, a crucial period for the forming of first impressions. On the issue of how, I argue that those proposals that would include the jurors taking an IAT are superior to those that would simply instruct jurors on what the IAT shows. In an area fraught with denial, mere instruction would likely be dismissed as irrelevant. I use pedagogical theory to show that experiential learning about bias is more likely to be effective.

I bring when and how together, proposing a model that would include the use of the IAT as an experiential learning tool during orientation. It would harness the civic energy of jurors to an educational purpose, rather than letting it morph into boredom; by putting jurors in an active mindset, it would enhance their satisfaction with the process, and their ability to perform optimally. As for potential jurors who are never selected, their participation would honor the long-standing educational function of jury service.

h/tip carapace

Research Guide for Juror Interviews: New Law Review Article

Barbara O'Brien, Samuel R. Sommers and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Ask and What Shall Ye Receive?  A Guide for Using and Interpreting What Jurors Tell Us, 14 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 201 (2011)

Introduction: Juries' decisions have profound consequences, yet the decision-making process is largely opaque. Researchers have therefore sought to understand as much as they can about how jurors perceive their task, interpret evidence, and render decisions.  One obvious approach to these questions is the direct one: simply ask jurors what they thought and why they reached the decision that they did. This straightforward tactic is certainly appealing, but it carries risks that can render the information it produces suspect. At the same time, however, some research questions are most accessible through this method. Rigorous, multi-jurisdictional studies have greatly advanced our understanding of jury decision-making, particularly when they combine self-report and archival data.  Although many researchers who use interviews are aware of the limitations and advantages of the method, no thorough and systematic evaluation of the general juror interview method has been published to date. Accordingly, we envision this Article as a guide for researchers considering the use of juror interviews in their own work, as well as for legal practitioners, scholars, and policymakers who seek to draw conclusions based on studies using this method. As judges and legal policymakers increasingly recognize the value of empirical research to guide trial strategy and reform, it becomes even more critical to conduct these types of studies properly and to draw the appropriate inferences from them. Without adequate attention to methodological limitations, overconfidence can easily distort the conclusions we draw from what jurors tell us.

Jury Nullification: Law Review

James M. Keneally, Jury Nullification Race and The Wire, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 941 (2010).

Introudction: Focusing on these questions and how they relate to the racial aspect of jury nullification, this article compares the fictional trial of Senator Clay Davis from the popular Home Box Office (HBO) television show The Wire to the real-life trial of former Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon. Davis’s trial was a study in race- and class based jury nullification, while Dixon’s trial was perceived as a rejection of that practice. Part II outlines the history of jury nullification. Part III provides a brief description of The Wire. Part IV examines the fictional trial of Senator Clay Davis and the real-life trial of Sheila Dixon, and the reasons for their disparate results. Finally, Part V concludes briefly with what we can deduce from the two trials regarding jury nullification’s role in the criminal justice system.